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a rebel, and eventually a courtier of Peter the
Great. He was also a prolific writer; his best-
known work was an Ottoman history. His
other works include a novel, an encyclopedia
of music, and works on geography, political
science, and philosophy, many of which re-
mained in manuscript at his death in 1723. The
only copy of his Sacro-sanctae indepingibilis
imago (1699–1700), known in the nineteenth cen-
tury, languished in Russian libraries for years be-
fore the eventual publication of a Rumanian trans-
lation in 1928 that bore the less suggestive title of
Metafizica. It then disappeared until Vlad Alexan-
drescu rediscovered it in Moscow in 2008. The
book under review provides a critical edition with
a translation into Italian on facing pages.
We are thus able for the first time to appraise
Cantemir’s interesting melange of old and new
philosophical ideas, formulated during long so-
journs in Constantinople among intellectuals
with connections to, or at least memories of, the
academies, classrooms, and libraries of Venice,
Padua, Bologna, Paris, Prague. In attempting to
devise a Christian approach to natural philoso-
phy, adding biblical insights to his own inspira-
tion, Cantemir was in good company. With the
rest of the philosophers belonging to the Mosaic
trend explored by Ann Blair and others, he
seemed to take the century of religious strife (in
his case, viewed from the standpoint of embat-
tled Greek Orthodoxy) as a cue to reexamine the
lingering pagan influences on early modern
thought, especially Aristotle. And like Robert
Fludd in the Utriusque cosmi . . . historia, he
dedicates the work to God, as “your creature,”
promising to make the divine Word the basis for
a new physics and metaphysics. The work is
structured around his “venatio,” as Van Hel-
mont or the purveyors of secrets studied by
William Eamon might have termed such a quest
for knowledge. He attains philosophical matu-
rity, according to his narration, when he finally
encounters a figure denominated “Caritas,” ac-
tually Sacred Science, and tries, at first with
little success, to articulate in words the visual
representations then shown to him. Sacred Sci-
ence, as his title states, is unrepresentable; to
think otherwise is the fundamental error of the
Aristotelian tradition.
Cantemir draws on Van Helmont, rather than
Paracelsus or Fludd, for the creation story that
will serve as a basis for his Mosaic approach.
There are two constitutive elements in the
world, not the tria prima of the Paracelsians.
Moreover, air and water are not simply two of
the four Aristotelian elements. The first is some-
times called “spirit” and sometimes “blas,” the
Helmontian term for an astral exhalation. Water
is really aquatic gas, again drawing on Van
Helmont. Both are activated by the archaeus,
Van Helmont’s life-giving principle, elaborated
from Paracelsus. In Cantemir, this principle is
“the artificer of the species, the protector and
multiplier of the seeds (seminum fautor)” (p.
138). Humankind partakes of divinity by way of
the immortal soul; and introspection is nothing
other than knowledge of God. Descartes seems
far away indeed from this account. Only if per-
verted by sense, or by misleading sentiments of
hubris deriving from the extraordinary products
of human ingenuity, may free will deviate from
the dictates of Divine Providence. Yet to state
that the divine plan is evidenced in all things is
not simply a statement of strict determinism.
“Fate” is as misleading a concept as are the
other two pagan notions of “chance” and “for-
tune.” If the human mind is unable to discern the
necessity of an occurrence, which therefore
seems like chance, this is simply because the
chain of causality is hidden from view.
The discussion thus turns from the macro-
cosm of celestial physics to the microcosm of
human behavior and ethics, such that in the
end the adept (Cantemir himself) may counsel
that, once you have acquired the Sacred Sci-
ence, you may set forth as a good and noble
soldier in the front lines of the Sacred Militia,
most courageous and most vigorous. “Combat
the war of God,” he exhorts, in tones that
contrast somewhat with the philosophical in-
tents. “Fight a legitimate battle, bring back
victory and distinguish wisely what consti-
tutes the good and the honest according to
God.” The adept has not forgotten that the
struggle to achieve enlightenment is more
than just a metaphorical one. “Love truth, flee
vice, recognize the difference between death
and death, life and life” (p. 437).
Apart from the introduction and notes, the
text is accompanied by an updating of the orig-
inal index to Cantemir’s manuscript and an in-
dex of major terms. While interesting in them-
selves, neither is of much help for locating
names and places throughout the book. How-
ever, on the whole, the edition is competent,
thorough, and an excellent accompaniment to
the growing variety of texts testifying to the
wide geographical reach and extraordinary va-
riety of early modern natural knowledge.
BRENDAN DOOLEY
Stephen Gaukroger. The Collapse of Mecha-
nism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the
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Shaping of Modernity, 1680–1760. x  505
pp., bibl., index. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010. $65 (cloth).
This substantial and erudite volume is the sec-
ond in Stephen Gaukroger’s massive project on
science and the shaping of modernity. The first
of the series, The Emergence of a Scientific
Culture (Oxford, 2006), posed the program-
matic question of the distinctiveness of the sci-
entific culture of the modern West: How did
science contribute to a profound transformation
of intellectual culture that resulted in the assim-
ilation of virtually all cognitive values to scien-
tific ones? One intriguing response to this ques-
tion offered in the first volume was that in the
early modern period the consolidation of a sci-
entific culture was accomplished not by a sepa-
ration of religion and natural philosophy, as is
often assumed, but by the fact that natural phi-
losophy could be accommodated to projects in
natural theology. Hence, an emerging natural
philosophy drew on religion for its social legit-
imation. That book, perhaps needless to say,
offered much more besides, and it showcased
Gaukroger’s rare capacity to pose broad ques-
tions of considerable importance while dealing
with specific issues in great scholarly detail.
This present work continues in much the same
vein, with painstaking and illuminating exposi-
tions of a range of historical developments, but
always with a view to informing the overarching
question of how scientific values came to form a
model for all of our cognitive claims.
The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of
Sensibility is organized around three key devel-
opments of the period 1680–1760. The first is to
do with the attempt to establish new metaphys-
ical foundations for areas of inquiry that ranged
from natural philosophy to theology and ethics.
Gaukroger’s discussion focuses on Malebranche,
Spinoza, and Leibniz. Refreshingly, this treatment
gives due consideration to the first of these think-
ers, whose contributions do not always receive the
attention they deserve from historians of science.
Gaukroger concludes that in the first half of the
eighteenth century these impressive attempts to
lend a metaphysical unity to the sciences ran
into a “dead end.”
The second theme concerns the tradition of
“physico-theology.” This enterprise, conducted
primarily in England, sought a convergence be-
tween the truths of natural theology and natural
philosophy. As already noted, in the first volume
of the series Gaukroger plausibly suggested that
the consolidation of experimental natural philos-
ophy in the seventeenth century depended on its
capacity to establish its religious credentials.
Natural philosophy succeeded in part because it
could be useful in the sphere of natural theology.
In the next phase of the story, however, Chris-
tianity itself is increasingly understood in light
of a new, modern conception of “religion” in
which the essence of various faiths is identified
primarily with their cognitive content. This en-
abled not only an impartial comparison of reli-
gions but also a comparison of the grounds of
belief of Christianity and natural philosophy. As
natural philosophy became more secure in its
cognitive claims, the prospects for the dissolu-
tion of the physico-theological union became
considerably greater.
The third development under consideration
took place largely in the Francophone world. In
its simplest version, the philosophes appropri-
ated natural philosophy as an exemplification of
enlightened rationality and used it to promote
their broader agenda. But the story Gaukroger
relates here is not the familiar narrative of an
Enlightenment triumph of science and reason
over superstition. Rather, the assumption that
there was a unified Newtonian-Lockean pro-
gram that exemplified reason became increas-
ingly difficult to sustain, not least because of the
development of a French Lockeanism that, from
the middle of the eighteenth century, began to
emphasize the way in which our cognitive judg-
ments are actually underpinned by sensibility,
rather than reason. This was one of a number of
factors in the rise of sensibility.
There are many particularly illuminating pas-
sages in the book, and I shall draw attention to
just two. In the fifth chapter, Gaukroger exam-
ines competing accounts of natural philosophy
and of what counted as a satisfactory explana-
tion in that domain. Traditionally, Aristotelian
natural philosophy had concerned itself with
matter theory, explaining change in terms of
causal principles that were associated with the
essences of things. These principles could be,
and to some extent were, carried over into a
corpuscular matter theory, with explanation re-
siding at the level of micro-mechanics. In these
cases the explanatory model is one of reduction,
with phenomena being accounted for in terms of
underlying structures. What these reductive
models of explanation have in common is an
attempt to penetrate beneath the phenomena to
something more fundamental. But we also have
at this time alternative “horizontal” explanations
that are mechanical or geometrical and that ei-
ther pertain to the phenomena alone or have
recourse to mathematical generalizations that re-
quire no reference to matter theory. (Complicat-
ing the issue further is the explanation role of
causation, which, following the abandonment of
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Aristotelian matter theory, tends to recede into
the background. Thus, how the new notion of
“force” relates to efficient causation remains
problematic.) Gaukroger’s helpful setting out of
these new plural modes of explanation, of which
I have given a very cursory account, offers a
fresh perspective on the early modern importa-
tion of the mixed mathematical sciences into
natural philosophy. At the same time, it points to
developing difficulties with the explanatory am-
bitions of mechanism and points forward to the
rejection, in the eighteenth century, of the ideal
of comprehensive systematic explanation in the
various branches of natural philosophy.
Another highlight, coming in the final chapter
of the book, is the treatment of eighteenth-
century theories of history and human develop-
ment. Here Gaukroger makes it clear that the
changing status of natural philosophy cannot be
accounted for simply in terms of what we used
to refer to as “internal” developments, but re-
quires an account of second-order discourses:
that is, contemporary commentary on the signif-
icance of the new discoveries, theories, and
methods of the sciences of nature. In eighteenth-
century France, these tended to come in the form
of developmental theories of human knowledge,
with their accompanying narratives of historical
progress. A key figure is d’Alembert, who shifts
the focus from epistemology to history and of-
fers a genealogy in which the natural philosoph-
ical achievements of his predecessors (primarily
Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Locke) are seen
as exemplifying a new stage in the development
of human knowledge. This dawning epoch sig-
nifies the new maturity of humanity and the
enlightened condition of the age. Gaukroger’s
approach here complements the recent work of
Dan Edelstein on the genealogy of the Enlight-
enment. For Gaukroger, as for Edelstein, the
achievement of philosophes such as d’Alembert
was not the setting out of new rational methods
of investigation but, rather, the construction of a
narrative about how preceding natural philoso-
phers were the harbingers of a new enlightened
age. These approaches are contrasted with that
of Hume—who, arguably, better reflects the ac-
tual commitments of the experimental natural
philosophers. As Gaukroger demonstrates, Hume
offers “natural histories” in place of genealogy
and regards it as a dangerous error to imagine
that any cognitive enterprise can be founded on
a putatively autonomous rationality. Hume thus
represents a challenge to the identification of
science with pure rationality and insists on a
balance between reason and sensibility.
There is, perhaps, more here on the collapse
of mechanism than on the rise of sensibility.
While the multiple reasons for the fragmentation
of mechanism are set out in compelling detail,
the account of the successes of sensibility—
which remains a somewhat elusive category—is
not as finely drawn. But considered in light of
the overall accomplishments of the book, these
are minor concerns. This volume is an exem-
plary exercise in intellectual history, and I ea-
gerly anticipate the next installment in the se-
ries.
PETER HARRISON
Dagmar Hu¨lsenberg; Ingo Schwarz (Editors).
Alexander von Humboldt: Gutachten zur Stein-
gutfertigung in Rheinsberg 1792. 161 pp., illus.
Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012. €49.80.
On 6 June 1792, the twenty-two-year-old Alex-
ander von Humboldt inspected a ceramics fac-
tory in Rheinsberg, Germany, for Friedrich An-
ton von Heinitz of the Prussian Bureau of
Mining and Metalworks. Freshly minted by the
Freiberg School of Mines and already a royal
assessor, Humboldt was to determine how to
improve productivity at Rheinsberg. His thirty-
two-page handwritten report (Gutachten), miss-
ing for many decades, was rediscovered and
transcribed into modern German in 1980. The
present study is the first thorough analysis of
this piece. The editors give sixty pages of in-
depth commentary before presenting a side-by-
side transcription, with facsimile, of the original. A
useful glossary of technical terms follows. The
production will certainly interest all readers of Isis
working on artisanal knowledge and industrial
history, particularly during the time of the so-
called Industrial Revolution.
Humboldt was acutely aware of the superior-
ity of English manufacture by comparison to
Germany’s, and his report contains frequent ref-
erences to practice across the Channel. In this
age of Wedgwood pottery and growing interest
in porcelain, Rheinsberg’s glazed products had
been competing unfavorably with English stone-
ware designed to look like porcelain. The Ger-
mans attempted to adopt the process—which
called for clay, quartz, and limestone—but the
factory had hit a bottleneck in wood supply, and
the quality of the stoneware was comparatively
poor. In his report, Humboldt proceeded system-
atically through all facets of the Rheinsberg
works, discussing the major ingredients of its
stoneware, the mills, and the furnaces. The Ger-
mans used far less limestone than did the Eng-
lish, Humboldt observed, which allowed for
cooler furnaces (and the use of less fuel) but also
reduced the quality of the finished product. The
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